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The Seven Deadly Virtues of Lobbyists:
What Lawyer Lobbyists Really Do
Nicholas W. Allard
ABSTRACT
The perception of lobbyists as a corrupt, antidemocratic force for dishonest governance is rooted more in myth
than fact. Lobbyists are adaptive, forward-thinking expert advocates who are vital to a healthy, self-correcting
representative democracy. Good lobbyists achieve results by building consensus. They give voice to and
empower those who seek to petition the government. While existing laws are more than adequate to address,
punish and discourage corruption, more can be done to assure transparency and to address the problem of
unfair influence by expanding the access of the less advantaged to professional lobbying. Any attempt to
improve lobbying should also focus on the rapidly changing nature of the profession in an increasingly com-
plex, global policy arena, in which increasingly people engage with the government electronically. Moreover,
understanding the links between fund raising by lobbyists and governance is a rich subject for further study. A
starting point to consider reforms and improvements is to have a better understanding of what lobbyists
actually do. They have ‘‘seven deadly virtues’’: First, lobbyists are an important source of information
and analysis for government decision-makers. Second, lobbyists inform their clients about how the govern-
ment works. Third, lobbyists hold each other accountable. Fourth, lobbyists hold government accountable.
Fifth, good professional lobbyists comply with the rules. Sixth, they make sure others comply. Seventh, lob-
byists are uniquely qualified to bridge partisan divides and find solutions to difficult problems. In sum, for
those interested in practicing at the intersection of law, politics, and business, lobbying is an honorable and
worthwhile profession. It is also an opportunity for lawyers young and old to make a real difference.
Recently I started a new chapter in my life.Last year I became a law school dean. My jour-
ney into legal education has given me the chance to
reflect and gain some fresh perspective on my expe-
riences over my decades-long experience as a pro-
fessional lawyer-lobbyist. It is a privilege to be
invited to participate in this outstanding confer-
ence.1 I am enormously interested in the research
and analysis of each of the distinguished pre-
senters. The participants may be surprised to
know that their scholarly work more often than
not is consistent with my experience and thinking.2
Nicholas W. Allard is the Joseph Crea Dean and Professor of
Law at Brooklyn Law School (BLS) in Brooklyn, NY.
This article is an expanded version of remarks Dean Allard made
on March 8, 2013, at State University of New York (SUNY) Buf-
falo Law School as part of the Baldy Center for Law and Policy
Conference on the Law of Democracy: Under the Influence?
Interests Groups, Lobbying, and Campaign Finance. The theme
of ‘‘The Seven Deadly Virtues of Lobbyists’’ and other related top-
ics was featured in Chapter 3 of Professor Beth L. Leech’s new
book: Lobbyists at Work (2013).
1I am especially grateful to Professor Michael Halberstam,
SUNY Buffalo Law School, and Daniel P. Tokaji for the invita-
tion, their effort to organize such a worthwhile and provocative
conference.
2In particular, I refer to, for example, Professor Frank Baum-
gartner and his colleagues’ impressive empirical evidence on
lobbying and public policy, and Professor Heather Gerken’s
call for public financing to address asymmetry, among others.
See, e.g., Baumgartner, Frank R., Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hoj-
nacki, David C. Kimball, and Beth L. Leech, Lobbying and Pol-
icy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why (University of
Chicago Press 2009).
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Nevertheless, I must say there have been moments
when I feel how an experienced trial lawyer must
feel watching an episode of Perry Mason. So
inspired and emboldened and determined not to
pick nits, I think this is a good opportunity to go
for a ‘‘teaching moment’’ and to attempt to wade
through the bayou of vitriolic rhetoric that often
surrounds lobbying. Unfortunately, much of the
public debate about lobbying aims at demonization
and scapegoating, which breeds visceral animosity
and unfairly paints lobbying as undemocratic and
inherently corrupt. I understand all too well that
moving the needle toward more rational and
insightful consideration of the topics covered in
this conference is an ambitious exercise.
The sources of misunderstanding about law-
making, policymaking, and lobbying are long estab-
lished: an almost intractable negative public opinion
about lobbying fueled in this century by politicians
who, though they know better, find it expedient to
feed the maw of dissatisfaction and distrust about
politics and lawmaking.3 This enduring hostility is
periodically heated by well published flaming
examples of illegal lobbying.4
In the United States everyone is entitled to an opin-
ion about our government. Sometimes it seems as if
almost all of the 315 plus million American people
are dead certain that lobbyists are corrupt, that
money buys results, and that lobbyists possess super-
powers that enable them to unduly influence weak
and gullible government officials. When the Obama
administration bashes lobbyists and acts as if its own
officials must be wrapped in a cocoon of regulation
to protect them from those who comply with the law
and register as lobbyists, while winking at those who
exploit influence and are not registered, it breeds dis-
trust and cynicism about government, undermines
transparency, and perpetuates a myth that policymakers
are not driven by facts, honesty, and judgment.5 The
administration does not want to allow lobbyists to be
among those who serve on advisory committees lest
they hornswoggle all the other pliable committee mem-
bers and the administration’s own appointees who
apparently are too witless to exercise their own inde-
pendent judgment.6 And it advanced a proposed rule
that would prohibit officials from the long-standing
practice of participating in ‘‘widely attended events’’
if a lobbyist is present, apparently fearing that a lobby-
ist can telepathically hypno-corrupt an official if they
merely are in the same convention venue or exhibition
hall.7 They ought to know better, and they do.
For the past several years I have been writing and
speaking about the myths and reality of how our incred-
ible self-correcting system of government actually
works, and defending lobbying as an honorable profes-
sion, while encouraging lawyers to consider govern-
ment advocacy as a career.8 Well, now, as the dean
of a law school, I think it worth one more try. In the
remarks that follow, I first attempt to debunk some
common misconceptions about lobbying and lob-
byists. Next, I discuss the seven deadly virtues of
lobbyists—theunderappreciatedcontributions that lob-
byists make to our political system—and ponder the
future of this honorable profession, including some
steps that can be taken to improve the current system.
I conclude with some thoughts on why lobbying is a
career that public-minded lawyers should consider.
3Since at least President Woodrow Wilson’s time, candidates in
every U.S. presidential election have run against lobbyists. Don-
ald W. Wolfensberger, Factions and Public Interest: Federalist
No. 10 in 2001 (May 18, 2001) (unpublished essay), avail-
able at <http: //www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/lobbyingintro
.pdf> . Barack Obama is the latest president to continue this tra-
dition. James A. Thurber, ‘‘Changing the Way Washington
Works?: Assessing President Obama’s Battle with Lobbyists,’’
Presidential Studies Quarterly (2011). James A. Thurber, ‘‘Oba-
ma’s Battle with Lobbyists’’, Chapter 8, Obama in Office (2011);
Also note references in each State of the Union Address by Pres-
ident Obama: Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress in
the State of the Union 2009–13 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 1 (Feb
24, 2009, Jan 27, 2010, Jan 25, 2011, jan 24, 2012, Feb 12, 2013).
4The public disfavor has reached an all-time low according to Law-
rence Lessig,Republic Lost. HowMoney Corrupts Congress—and
a Plan to Stop It (2011).
5James A. Thurber, Obama in office, chapter 8 (2011).
6< http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-
memorandum-lobbyists-agency-boards-and-commissions > .
Recently in Autor v. Pitzker, Civ. No. 12-5379 ( Jan 17, 2014), a
three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit reversed the earlier district
court’s dismissal of a challenge by six lobbyists to the so-called
advisory committee ban. The appellate court remanded the case
with instructions to consider the plaintiff’s constitutional claims
on the merits.
7< http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-09-13/pdf/2011-
23311.pdf > , widely attended event proposal.
8Prior to becoming the Dean of BLS, at Patton Boggs LLP, I
chaired the public policy department and the government advo-
cacy practice—the perennially top-rated lobbying practice in
the United States. For several years I have been writing and
speaking on the profession of lobbying and related regulatory
issues. See, e.g., Nicholas W. Allard, ‘‘Lobbying is an Honora-
ble Profession: The Right to Petition and the Competition to Be
Right,’’ 19 Stanford Law and Policy Review 23 (2008) [herein-
after Honorable Profession]; ‘‘My Turn: We Need More Lobby-
ists,’’ Newsweek (Feb. 22, 2010); Foreword (with Thomas Hale
Boggs, Jr.) and ‘‘Practical Perspectives on the Practice of Lob-
bying,’’ Ch. 40, The ABA Lobbying Manual: A Complete Guide
to Federal Lobbying Law and Practices, (4th Edition 2011 sup-
plement, Luneberg, Susman and Gordon, eds.) [hereinafter
Practical Perspectives].
SEVEN DEADLY VIRTUES OF LOBBYISTS 211
THE MYTHS AND REALITIES
OF LOBBYING
‘‘Why should I have to hire a lobbyist to talk with
my government?’’ It is a legitimate threshold ques-
tion. After all, it is our government, which is sup-
posed to be working for us. Well consider, for
example, that you had a medical issue that, God for-
bid, required surgery. Would you operate on your-
self? No, of course not. You would want the best,
most experienced specialist that you could find.
The same can be said if you have an interest in a sig-
nificant public policy issue. It’s not always brain
surgery, but you take my point. Lawyers have a say-
ing: Anyone who represents themselves in court has
a fool for a lawyer and an idiot for a client. Simi-
larly, the arenas where our laws are written and pol-
icies made and implemented are even more difficult
venues to make your case than in a court room. Pro-
fessionals, expert advocates, are needed in both set-
tings. There are no quick fixes, silver bullets, or
magic wand solutions. If anyone offers that kind
of lobbying service, the client should run the other
way. Perversely, this is often the hardest lesson to
‘‘teach’’ clients, who often expect results with the
snap of a finger, or perhaps a simple phone call. Tra-
ditional lawyers pursue the question, ‘‘What is the
law?’’ Lobbyists pursue the question, ‘‘What should
the law be?’’ The answer to that question, inevita-
bly, is what is the best accommodation of compet-
ing, albeit legitimate interests—‘‘What is in the
public interests?’’—and the plural ‘‘interests’’ is
intentional. For any significant policy issue that
touches multiple constituencies, the advocacy effort
involves, in our heterogeneous democratic republic,
the arduous process of consensus building over
time, often in many arenas where our laws are
made, shaped, and implemented.
The popular myths about the profession are a lot
sexier than the reality. Consider the myth that ‘‘the
system is rotten and all involved are corrupt’’ versus
the reality that ‘‘the system works as intended and
most everyone involved, including public officials
and lobbyists are hard-working, dedicated, and hon-
est.’’ Are there exceptions? Of course. But the
exceptions prove the rule, and are often examples
of the law being enforced. Inevitably the bad
apple gets caught and punished, like notorious con-
victed lobbyist Jack Abramoff, former Representa-
tives Randy ‘‘Duke’’ Cunningham and William
Jefferson. And that is why you know about them.
They attract a lot of attention for the wrong reasons.
Abramoff, for example, was not a lobbyist, he was a
crook. He was running, in effect, a political Ponzi
scheme, and Ponzi schemes always, inevitably,
eventually collapse. Or consider the myth that
‘‘money buys results’’ versus the reality that ‘‘results
are determined by public policy considerations.’’
The dirty little secret is that our Government cannot
be bought—and in truth, it can’t even be rented—
thanks to the complicated system our founders
established, of levers and brakes, and the self-
interest of lawmakers to remain in office.9 If you
don’t believe me, consider what legendary political
figures, such as California Senator Jesse Unruh, and
former House Speaker Sam Rayburn colorfully and
vividly had to say about the subject.10 This point is
definitely contrary to conventional wisdom. I can
be accused of many things, but being naı¨ve is not
one of them. Sure, there are unfortunate examples
of corruption, and troubling asymmetries in the
power to influence, but by and large, the system is
legitimate.11 Finally, think of the popular opinion
that ‘‘quick fixes, cutting corners, and backroom
deals are the rule of the day’’ versus ‘‘anything
done can be undone, and the public process is it-
self highly competitive,’’ which are powerful self-
correcting mechanisms. Granted the accuracy of
this observation, the viability of our system to self-
correct depends on transparency. Still, by and
large the policy process is a never-ending and
ongoing balancing act among vigorously competi-
tive interests. No one in the long run has a monopoly
on access, information, or persuasiveness. Hubert
Humphrey was brilliant on this point. He memora-
bly noted: ‘‘The right be heard does not automati-
cally include the right to be taken seriously.’’12 To
prevail in the policy process, to be heard above
the cacophony of the multitudes of compelling
9Allard, Honorable Profession, supra note 8, at 30–31, nn, 19,
20; see also Lessig, supra note 4, at chapter 1 (discussing his
concept of ‘‘dependence corruption).
10Allard, Honorable Profession, supra note 8, at n.19.
11I am not talking about what are referred to as ‘‘earmarks.’’
That is a practice where often there is too much of an appear-
ance, if not the reality, that campaign contributions influence
results, that taxpayer money ends up in the hands of those
who lobby and pay politicians with campaign contributions
and favors.
12Senator Herbert H. Humphrey, Remarks Before the Young
Democrats of Arizona (Sept. 10, 1966), quoted in Silencing
the Opposition: Government Strategies of Suppression of the
Freedom of Expression, 194–95 (Craig K. Smok, ed. 1996).
212 ALLARD
voices trying to be heard, to make an effectively
compelling case, to fashion a solution to overcome
a political impediment, and to hang on to an out-
come once achieved, it helps to have a good honest
lobbyist.
Lobbyists, like many lawyers, are not hired to
win popularity contests, much less to be loved.
Indeed having a thick skin is one of the most essen-
tial tools of the trade. So the question arises: ‘‘Why
should we care about the Olympic sport of Whack-
a-Lobbyist?’’ Lobby bashing is almost irresistible in
the present climate—like scratching a rash. While it
may feel good at the time, it actually makes things
worse. It breeds distrust of Government at a time
when building trust is needed to obtain concessions
and to forge solutions to tough problems. Usually
it’s just about polls and politics. To paraphrase the
quip often attributed to President Truman, who
must have had tongue firmly in cheek, ‘‘if you are
with me then you support the public interest, if
you oppose me you are lobbying for a special inter-
est.’’13 It is counter-intuitive and not the conven-
tional wisdom, but limits on lobbying favor the
powerful who have many avenues to secure their
objective, and disadvantage disproportionately the
less advantaged people and groups in society. If
the concern is undue influence, asymmetrical
advantage, the best solution is to provide a profes-
sional advocate to the less advantaged. This is
done in the civil and criminal justice systems with
legal aid, public defenders, and other methods to
provide needed legal services. Finding ways to
give the less advantaged more access to lobbying
muscle is a solution to unfair advantage in the pol-
icy arena. Moreover, lobby bashing, like three card
Monte, is a game of diversion. It ignores and obfus-
cates the real problems and needed solutions. In my
view, it has been a mistake for the Obama adminis-
tration to burden, restrict, and penalize lobbyists
who comply with law and register as lobbyists
when required to do so, while there is little enforce-
ment of lobbying rules and regulations against those
who ignore or break the rules.14 Similarly, it is a
mistake to take a simplistic approach to concerns
about the so-called ‘‘revolving door.’’15 The relevant
questions for appointments to office are (1) is the
person qualified for the position, and (2) can the
person put the public interest ahead of their personal
private interest and do they have a conflict of inter-
est. The answers to these questions have nothing to
do with whether the prospective appointee complied
with the law and is registered as a lobbyist. More-
over, most of the current political attacks on lobby-
ing focus on yesterday’s headlines and ignore that
lobbying is changing and that there are real new
issues raised that beg to be addressed.
SOMETHING REALLY WORTH THINKING
ABOUT: THE FUTURE
Roasting all the old chestnuts about caricatures of
lobbying and lobbyists of the past ignores the trans-
formation of how and where and what lobbyists
actually now do and how they will operate in the
new world of law. Often it seems as if reformers
are arguing about, and want to change, a world
that never really quite existed, but certainly has little
to do with the future.
It is a cliche´ to say the world is increasingly a
global community. Due to advanced online net-
works and the virtually borderless interconnected
world we live in, more than ever before, lobbying
skills are needed to address the multinational nature
of issues. First, and most obviously, there are more
multinational interests: overseas firms, for exam-
ple, that wish to expand and invest in the United
States, and U.S.-based concerns that have interests
abroad.16 These global players require sophisticated
multinational government advocacy representation.
They also require expert compliance advice and
risk assessment among other needed government
13See generally, discussion in Allard, Practical Perspectives,
supra note 8, at 5 and n.18.
14Thurber, ‘‘Changing the Way,’’ supra note 3, at 6; Thurber,
‘‘Obama In Office,’’ supra note 3, at 9. Once elected President
Obama restricted participation by federal registered lobbyists
on his transition team and later his administration, but excep-
tions were allowed. He instituted a strong ethics code for all
executive branch appointees, implemented a stricter gift ban,
and restricted the ‘‘revolving door’’ for lobbyists both in and
out of government. He also banned direct lobbying for funds
and tax breaks from the Troubled Assets Relief Program
(TARP) and the 2009 American recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 (ARRA) economic stimulus package. Id. Some
would observe this last measure amounted to an unprecedented
and one-sided interference with the use of effective counsel.
Thurber questions the effectiveness of the new rules. Sec C.9.
Lee Fang, ‘‘Where Have All the Lobbyists Gone?, The Shadow
Lobbying Complex’’, The Nation (Feb. 19, 2014).
15< http://www/gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-01-26/pdf/E9-
1719.pdf > (revolving door rule).
16For a vivid description of the demands for and growth of these
services, see Eric Lipton and Danny Hakim, ‘‘Lobbying
Bonanza As Firms Try to Influence European Union,’’ New
York Times, p. 1 (Oct. 13, 2013).
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relations and regulatory services, especially those
relating to financial services, privacy, and security.
Second, on many large issues, such as financial
regulatory reform, climate change, and energy pol-
icy, for example, the policy advocacy has become a
three- or four-dimensional chess game. For exam-
ple, the core reason that the G7 became the G20
was because it was understood that it is not possible
to effect financial regulatory changes unilaterally.
Washington cannot act alone, unless, London, Brus-
sels, and Asia are moving in roughly parallel direc-
tions and vice versa. The same can be said for
spectrum policy, Internet privacy and security, cli-
mate change, energy, and a host of other issues of
global borderless scope. On many issues the BRIC
countries: Russia, Brazil, India, and China must
be considered. Consequently, if you want to influ-
ence the U.S. government on policy rules, it helps
to persuade other governments, including the so-
called BRIC countries, and vice versa.
New technology: Broadband interconnectivity
Another major change is that increasingly the
public interacts with the government electronically,
often directly, without a middleman. The ‘‘face-to-
face meeting’’ by a lawyer representing a client
with an official, or simply providing raw informa-
tion to clients, such as texts of bills and summa-
ries of hearings, are diminished in value. This puts
a premium on expert analysis of ever increasingly
available information in the public domain, as
well as professional advice and advocacy. There
are also powerful new advocacy techniques that
we are only beginning to fully appreciate. Witness
how Google and others stopped the proposed anti-
piracy legislation recently that the powerful Motion
Picture Association of America backed (the Stop
Online Piracy Act (SOPA).17) In 2012, this legisla-
tion was a train on a fast track, supported by the
powerful Hollywood studio interests, but it was
killed overnight by new media techniques. Internet
users also managed to block the Cybersecurity Act
of 2012 with online grass roots techniques. It was
like watching the Old School Redcoats marching
in traditional battle formation getting picked off
by unconventional online minutemen guerilla fight-
ers. Such techniques, cyber lobbying, will increase
as the One-hundred Thirteenth and later Congresses
take up several privacy/security measures such as
updating and reform to 1986 laws, the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act18 and the Electronic Commu-
nications Privacy Act (ECPA),19 and the proliferat-
ing so-called ‘‘patent troll’’ inquiries gaining so
much attention before Congress, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), and States Attorneys. Consider
also how President Obama uses very effectively, as
do increasingly many political campaigns, new
media to campaign, raise money, and build political
support. Similar techniques can be used in lobbying
and government relations advocacy campaigns.20
Some other big questions that bear study
First, do we run the government like American
Idol? Lawmakers essentially have the technological
capability to run a referendum on innumerable
issues before them. But should they? The issue of
whether government officials are mere delegates
or representatives is hardly new. Hopefully, we
will remember the wisdom of Sir Edmund Burke,
who told the electors of Bristol in 1774, ‘‘your rep-
resentative owes you, not his industry only, but his
judgment, and he betrays, instead of serving you,
if he sacrifices it to your opinion.’’21 (Of course,
Sir Edmund did, in fact, lose his next election, so
ignore public opinion at your peril.)
Second, do lawmakers and regulators treat all
blogs and Tweets alike? Those with money and
new media savvy can flood the media with their
messages and drown out others who lack the techno-
logical means to join the ‘‘great melody’’ of public
discourse. The answer is that the government is
wrestling with how best to weigh and evaluate all
the input it now seeks and receives electronically
outside the time-worn contours of the traditional
legislative and administrative process. Law jour-
nals are filling up with articles discussing whether
and how electronic comments and blogs should
be considered and weighed within the somewhat
17Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
Regarding changing lobbying techniques see Holly Yeager,’’
Lobbying Shop McBee Strategic represents the changing busi-
ness of Influence, The Washington Post (February 21, 2014).
18P.L. 99-474 (1986).
1918 U.S.C. x 2510 (2002).
20I am not doing justice to the rough and tumble changing world
of lobbying at the state level. Among the insightful and highly
readable treatments of the topic is Jerry Kremer, Winning
Albany (2013), a memoir written by a distinguished alumnus
of Brooklyn Law School.
21Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol (Nov 3,
1774), in 2 The Works of Edmund Burke 7, 12 (1839).
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dusty four corners of the Administrative Procedures
Act.22
Third, what should be done about the information
‘‘have nots’’? Without access to affordable new
mobile broadband technology and the know-how
to use it, technology ‘‘have nots’’ lack the keys to
both opportunity and participatory democracy.
They are being left behind. It is imperative to find
ways to close, what we used to call and still should
be a prime concern, ‘‘the digital divide’’ to prevent
people from becoming disenfranchised. It is, in
my view, a fundamental principle that our society
must ensure that the voices of the less advantaged
are heard, that we help all to be heard effectively.23
Fourth, what more can be learned about the con-
nections, the interplay between elections and lobby-
ing? I would submit that much is assumed, but not
enough is well understood, about the subject. For
example, how should we measure the impact of lob-
byists on elections? Much is written about lobbyists
as political donors, fundraisers, and ‘‘bundlers.’’ No
doubt the election system is awash with money as
Larry Lessig and others document.24 And, it cor-
rodes our democratic system (I would say corrodes
rather than corrupts). What is the significance of
money from lobbyists? Is it a drop in an ocean of
money? Or, does is somehow have outsized impact,
and if so, how to address that. Can legislators
decline to take money from registered lobbyists dur-
ing the election cycle, or during a Congress when a
lobbyist appears before them?25 How does the
dependence on political fundraising actually relate
to the role of lobbyists and governing, or the failure
to govern between elections? Is it not the case that
the impact of money in shaping outcomes is over-
stated and the real scandal is that nonstop fundrais-
ing leaves elected officials little if any time to do
their jobs? It may make them more dependent on
lobbyists—not for money, but to get the work of leg-
islators done. In brief, the links between profes-
sional lobbying and elections should be better
understood and the topic is rich and worthy of con-
siderable further study.26
THE VIRTUES OF LOBBYISTS
You don’t hear any of the 315 million experts in
the United States say much about the benefits of
lobbyists. I can list seven deadly virtues that explain
what lobbyists actually do for a living.
The first thing lobbyists do is provide informa-
tion to the government to inform its decisions. This
is the best understood and most widely discussed
function of lobbyists, at least among those who
study the subject carefully.27 While no one can
deny that our federal and state governments have
their fair share of experts in every field imaginable,
often times the information simply does not reach
the decision makers. Also, lawmakers may not appre-
ciate the impact of proposals they are considering or
the possible unintended consequences of legislation
and regulations as drafted. It is especially frustrating
when a provision is meant to be helpful to a business
or constituency and quite the contrary is the case.
Lobbyists bring information to those decision mak-
ers, and an informed decision is certainly preferred
to simple guesswork. But members of Congress and
other government officials have many sources of
information. They do not just have to rely on lobby-
ists. They have the Congressional Research Service,
they have staff, and they have information in the pub-
lic domain. If there were no lobbyists, lawmakers
would still be getting information.
Second, and perhaps at least as important, good
lobbyists provide accurate information to their
clients about how the government works, what
to expect, what is realistic. This important role
played by lobbyists empowers citizens to effectively
22Bridget C.E. Dooling, ‘‘Legal Issues in E-Rulemaking,’’ 63
Admin. L. Rev. 893 (2011). Stephen M. Johnson, ‘‘Beyond the
Usual Suspects, ACUS, Rulemaking 2.0, and a Vision for
Broader, More Informed, and More Transparent Rulemaking,’’
65 Admin. L. Rev. 77 (2013).
23Edward Wyatt ‘‘U.S. fails to narrow its digital divide’’ Inter-
national Herald Tribune p. 4 (August 16, 2013).
24See Lessig, supra note 5.
25The American Bar Association (ABA) Lobbying Task Force
proposed limits on accepting contributions from lobbyists.
ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice,
Task Force on Federal Lobbying Laws, Lobbying Law In The
Spotlight: Challenges And Proposed Improvements (2011)
available at < http: //www.americanbar.org/content/doc/aba/
migrated/2011-build/administrative/law/lobbying-task-force-
report-010311.authcheckdoc.pdf > [hereinafter ABA Lobbying
Task Force].
26Richard Briffault, The Anxiety of Influence: The Evolving
Regulation of Lobbying (January, 2014) Columbia Public Law
Research Paper No. 14-367. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2384645.
27SeeBertram J. Levine, The Art of Lobbying: Building Trust and
Selling Policy (2008); Congress: How the System Really Works
(2d Ed. 1996): Leech, supra note 1: William Luneburg, ‘‘The
Evolution of Federal Lobbying Regulation,’’ 41 McGeorge
L.Kev.85 (2009); Thomas Susman, ‘‘Lobbying in the 21st Cen-
tury and the Need for Reform,’’ 58 Admin. L.Kev.737 (2006).
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exercise their First Amendment right to petition the
government. Navigating the maddeningly confusing
maze of government bureaucracy and frequently
encountering intransigence and delay severely con-
strains each citizen’s ability to exercise their constitu-
tional rights; lobbyists act as guides that inform and
manage the expectations of their clients. This saves
time and energy, resulting in a more efficient alloca-
tion of resources. When a client presents an issue
and their objective, good lawyer-lobbyists will be
able to advise the client whether their goals are real-
istic or not. They will explain to the client that
‘‘maybe if you try to seek something slightly differ-
ent, you could accomplish something close to what
you wanted.’’ I am talking about the good lobbyists.
Good lobbyists will not take credit for the sun com-
ing up, and they will also say when they cannot do
something. They will level with their clients, telling
them things like: ‘‘That tax change has no chance
of getting enacted this year.’’ And, ‘‘By the way, what
is the public policy argument for what you want
done?’’ Because, unless there is a compelling policy
argument, members of Congress and regulators
aren’t going to support it, because it’s not a justifi-
able or sustainable result.
Third, lobbyists help keep the system honest by
holding other interests and lobbyists accountable—
it’s an adversarial process. It is commonly accepted
that competition breeds excellence and it is the lob-
byist who competitively advocates for the ideas and
interests of its clients. When the system works, and
the rules are followed, the best ideas win out. This
assumes transparency. It assumes that you know
what’s going on. Sunlight is one of the great disin-
fectants in the policy arena.28 Professional lobbyists
who play by the rules don’t fear transparency. They
embrace it because they want to have the opportu-
nity, like a lawyer in court has, to challenge the
other side. This is why one of the most effective
techniques of being a lobbyist is to say to a decision
maker: ‘‘Here’s our case and this is why we like it.
And this is what the other side is going to say, and
this is why you should discount that.’’ The lobbyists
for each side hold each other accountable.
Fourth, lobbyists help keep the system honest by
holding the government accountable. Government
officials often do not like this—they would rather
not have this thorn in their side—just like the
press is often regarded as an annoyance, a necessary
evil. Both the right to petition, and freedom of the
press are protected in the First Amendment as
important checks on government power. Lobbyists
act as conduits between the government and their
constituents; when the constituents aren’t happy,
the government hears about it.29
Fifth, professional lobbyists comply with rules.
Crooks and amateurs do not do this. People who
make their living lobbying must comply to con-
tinue practicing and their clients insist on compli-
ance. Ironically, in my experience, the bigger the
corporate client, the more the company is interested
in compliance. Sometimes it seems that they prefer
compliance to results. A related point is that the
rules for lobbying—including things like the so-called
and much bally-hooed ‘‘toothpick rule’’ concerning
what food a lobbyist can serve to members and
staff—including the gift rules and a long list of excep-
tions—address esoteric questions such as ‘‘when is
food not a meal?’’30 These lobbying rules are so
arcane and so complicated that a layperson could
not be expected to understand them, much less comply.
The rules are neither intuitive or common sense. So,
clients need professional lobbyists to make sure that
when they are making their case, they are doing it in
a way that is appropriate and complies with the rules.
Sixth, lobbyists make sure others follow the
rules—they are whistle blowers about noncompli-
ance by other lobbyists. That is right out of the Lob-
bying 101 playbook. One of the standard tactics of
lobbying in an adversarial situation is to check the
lobbying registration of the opposing lobbyist and
start making noise if they’re violating the rules.
Do you believe that most cases of scandal are dis-
covered by the Justice Department or State Attor-
neys General? Heck, no. It is more likely that the
28Louis Brandeis, ‘‘What Publicity Can Do’’, Harper’s, Weekly,
p. 10, Dec 20, 1913 (‘‘Publicity is justly commended as a remedy
for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.’’)
29If I were a cynic, I would suspect that the Obama administra-
tion’s prohibitions barring clients using registered lobbyists in
TARP and ARRA meetings has more to do with avoiding the
inconvenience of dealing with effective advocates than any
realistic ethical concerns.
30Under the House and Senate gift rules, members may accept
free attendance at receptions where ‘‘food and beverage of nom-
inal value when served as other than part of a meal’’ is available.
Because ‘‘nominal value’’ is not defined, guidance indicates
that snacks, hors d’oeuvres, etc. are acceptable at receptions
(which do not have the diverse attendance requirement of
widely attended events where a meal may be served) and
hence the toothpick rule. Food that can eaten with a toothpick,
standing up, without a plate, and certainly not a knife and fork,
is probably permissable.
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lobbyists for the other side or the press who discov-
ered noncompliance from other lobbyists reported
misconduct and noncompliance. Professional lob-
byists help keep the system honest.
Seventh, lobbyists provide civility and help dis-
cordant, partisan dug-in interests come together
and find solutions. Yes, they broker deals, get things
done, guilty as charged. When there are partisan
quarrels in Congress and in the government, lobby-
ists can be back-channel messengers, come up with
solutions, talk to people, reduce flaring tempera-
tures, and figure out how to overcome an impas-
se.that’s what professional lobbyists do. You can
accuse lobbyists of many things but I cannot think
of a single, successful lobbyist who is rude or
makes uncivil comments.
Notwithstanding these seven virtues, it seems
often that the whole country is convinced that legis-
lators and regulators are marionettes who need to be
kept separated from the devious and dangerous
puppet-master lobbyists. The unfortunate disingen-
uous anti-lobbying tenets of the Obama administra-
tion take advantage of this common misconception.
The reality is that lawmakers in Congress and agen-
cies make tough, informed decisions every day.
They aren’t impressionable children who need pro-
tecting from the dangerous influence of lie-peddling
dealers of dopey, self-serving ideas. The administra-
tion’s anti-lobbying position claims to be providing
transparency and accountability through its hostile
stance on lobbying, but what it really does is punish
those who follow the law, those who register, report
their activities, and do their job correctly. By impos-
ing penalties on legal lobbying, the administration
in adventently is encouraging those who violate
the law.
When students ask me what it is that lobbyists do,
I tell them that lobbyists do what a good lawyer
should do; they do what I call the 3 A’s: Analyze,
Advise, and Advocate. Like lawyers, lobbyists repre-
sent a client, analyze their problems or goals, advise
those clients on what they should do, and then advo-
cate zealously for their client. Lobbying—like any
other honorable profession—has both good and
bad apples. The fact of the matter is that lobbying
is a necessary and important aspect of connecting
American citizens to those who represent them in
government.
In truth, lobbyists are not the source of the com-
plex problems our nation currently faces, such as leg-
islative gridlock, bitter partisanship, the economic
downturn, unpopular wars, and global threats, from
terrorism to financial, to data privacy and environ-
mental issues. Scapegoating lobbyists intentionally
or unintentionally drains time and energy from debat-
ing and addressing these real issues. In addition to
diverting attention away from the critical issues and
overlooking the inherent value and necessity of pub-
lic advocacy, rhetorical attacks on lobbyists feed the
sad idea that politics is bad and that the honest, dili-
gent women and men working in public service are
gullible and corruptible, if not corrupt themselves.
It breeds distrust in government precisely when
greater trust and confidence are needed to achieve
consensus and develop innovative solutions to very
significant problems. In fact, successful lobbyists
are honest and hardworking and follow the rules.
In Washington, DC, alone there are approxima-
tely 80,000 attorneys, a large number of whom engage
in public policy work broadly conceived. At this writ-
ing, there are about 12,000 people who are officially
designated as lobbyists within the narrow definition in
the Lobbying Disclosure Act. Exceedingly few of
these people would contemplate breaking an ethical
rule or tolerate anyone who does. In fact, lobbyists
in law firms thrive on compliance with rules and
must adhere to the bar associations’ professional stan-
dards and codes of ethics in addition to government
lobbying rules. Like the ad for the kosher hot dog
company, lawyer lobbyists can honestly say: ‘‘we
have to answer to a higher authority.’’31
Thus, in an environment of fundamental honesty
and dynamic competition, quick fixes and cutting
corners are sure paths to failure, and deceit and ille-
gality will derail a career permanently. The success-
ful practice of public policy is rooted in the mastery
of procedures and the ability to explain how a given
position advances the public interest. Like litiga-
tion, this advocacy work is conducted in a highly
competitive, complex, and professional environment.
The colorful, popular, wickedly glamorous image
of the cigar-chomping, bird-hunting, joke-telling,
31The use and relevance of professional ethical standards of
lawyers in the lobbying context is a fertile field for further
study and consideration. See ABA Lobbying Task Force,
supra note 25. Canadian federal and provincial regulations
are examining related issues carefully including whether to
adopt a Code of Conduct. See Canadian Lobbying Act, 1985,
c. 44 (4th Supp.), available at < http: //laws.justice.gc.ca/en/
showtdoc/cs/c-12.4 > . The issue of lobbying regulations has
been a topic of vigorous discussion at the St. Petersburg
Legal Forum in Russia (May 2013).
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martini-drinking, Gucci-wearing door-opener over-
shadows the skills of most successful lobbyists who
may enjoy some of these naughty pleasures, though
never all at once. Moreover, what may or may not
have worked for lobbyists in the past is beside the
point. The profession, techniques, and rules of the
road are evolving rapidly.
There is no question about it—lobbying can be
improved. The practice is hardly perfect. Its public
reputation is lousy. Lobbyists should continue to
strive to conduct their activities with integrity and
honesty; they should always be frank about what
they do (while also respecting confidentiality) and
always observe the highest professional and ethical
standards. There could be more stringent en-
forcement of existing rules, including registration
requirements and ethics laws, and increased disclo-
sure of those activities that constitute lobbying.
If the public’s true concern is asymmetry in the
system, where some moneyed interests have more
lobbying clout, then the answer is to endeavor to
afford the underrepresented more lobbying clout.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the counterintui-
tive solution to the problem of undue influence is
more lobbying, not less. Instead of trying to limit
the use of expert advocacy, we should find ways to
give the less advantaged a louder voice in the legis-
lative and regulatory processes. Universal access to
lobbying provides a check on special access and
unfair influence and helps to hold lawmakers
accountable. Thus, rather than determining ways
to restrict lobbying, we should consider ways to
increase access to public policy advocacy. For exam-
ple, using the legal industry as a guide, we should set
goals for the amount of pro bono work every lobby-
ist undertakes, annually recognize outstanding con-
tributions, and make pro bono public service part
of a lobbyist’s job description—just as it is part of
the American Bar Association’s rules of professional
conduct for lawyers. We should also empower Main
Street Americans by helping them establish lobbying
coalitions—groups of individuals united by a com-
mon purpose. People are already able to join their
legal claims in class actions and often to the chagrin
of big corporations, use contingency fees to retain
lawyers they could not otherwise afford. Similar
approaches to help individuals seeking to put their
support behind a policy claim are worth exploring.
In addition, we should encourage universities and col-
leges to extend their loan-forgiveness programs to
graduates who lobby for underrepresented groups—
consider, for example, establishing a ‘‘Lobby for
America’’ program modeled after Teach for America.
Finally, we could find ways to provide all Americans
with the access and know-how to use e-mail and
social media, because we increasingly interact with
our government online.
For these suggestions to catch on, of course, the
American public needs to have an accurate picture
of how the public policy advocacy system operates,
as the reality is much different from the conventional
or popular wisdom that lobbying is a simple, linear
process whereby campaign contributions and other
‘‘favors’’ lead to relationships of special access and
influence, which subsequently form the bedrock of
essentially quid pro quo deal making. The best-kept
secret in America may be that our government cannot
be bought. If it could—if all it took to prevail were
buying a few steaks, sponsoring a golf trip, or making
campaign contributions—then anyone could buy an
outcome. There would be no need to hire professional
lobbyists to help steer through the procedural and
political labyrinth. Fortunately, this is not the case.
In reality, successful advocacy ultimately de-
pends on the lobbyist’s ability to explain how
a given position advances the public interest, to
respond to counter-argument advances by persua-
sive and skillful advocates, and to do so credibly,
consistently, and concisely. As opposed to a simple
or linear model of influence, practicing the lobbying
profession is in fact a multifaceted and competitive
enterprise, involving more hard work than one
might imagine. In actuality, lobbyists navigate con-
gressional thickets, decipher 2,000-page bills and
complex regulations, and fundamentally contribute
to a marketplace of ideas that benefits everyone—
not just the person who pays the most. Lobbyists
work hard to help the public understand the govern-
ment, effectively providing a ‘‘Rosetta Stone’’ for
policy and politics to the average citizen. Whether
it is explaining and helping constituents compre-
hend and shape complex health or financial regula-
tion proposals or getting recovery funds from the
government and back into the economy, Washington
representatives are providing an important service to
all American citizens—left or right, young or old,
rich or poor, popular or unpopular.
LOBBYING AS A CAREER
Lobbying is not only a necessary and honorable
profession; it also offers an interesting, worthwhile
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career that provides a path to participation in the
world’s most renowned democracy, with an oppor-
tunity to make a difference. From another perspec-
tive, it provides a unique, exciting career path for
new lawyers. For the right kind of lawyer—a lawyer
who is fascinated by the intersection of law, politics,
and client interests—it is an extremely attractive
line of work, especially because the answer to the
question of what the legal rules and policies should
be necessarily involves achieving a consensus about
what is in the public interest.
In the last few years, while discussing the subject of
lobbying in articles, lectures, speeches, and other pro-
grams, I have been quite surprised to receive hundreds
of inquiries from young lawyers and law students ask-
ing how they can get involved in public policy work
as lobbyists. I initially assumed that such interest
stemmed from the poor legal market; and I would
sometimes facetiously say that they all must be broad-
ening their horizons in an effort to secure gainful
employment—surely, it must be a sign of how desper-
ately bad the job market was that young lawyers were
‘‘even’’ considering lobbying as an option. I was pleas-
antly surprised, however, when some colleagues,
including my dear friend Professor Jesse Choper, the
former dean at Boalt Hall, caught me up short and vig-
orously disagreed. Professor Choper told me that he
believed the lawyers and students I was hearing from
were actually responding because their eyes had
been opened to the possibility of an exciting career
in public policy. I hope that is true—if you are a law
student considering your options or an attorney con-
templating a career change, consider pursuing the pub-
lic interest as a professional lobbyist. With apologies
to Waylon Jennings and Willie Nelson: ‘‘Mommas,
please let your babies grow up to be lobbyists.’’
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